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CHAPTER 13 
Torts 
MICHAEL E. MONE" and PATRICIA L. KELLY"" 
§13.1. Introduction. During the present Survey year, the Supreme 
Judicial Court and the General Court have contit)ued to advance the 
interests of injured persons in the tort field by deserting old precedents 
involving governmental and municipal liability, the attractive nuisance 
doctrine, and the necessity of the proof of "hidden defect" in landowners' 
liability cases. The two significant statutory enactments in the area of 
governmental immunity 1 and attractive nuisance 2 have followed the 
Court's strong suggestion in Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth 3 
and Mounsey v. Ellard 4 that it would reassess old doctrine in the light 
of present concepts of societal responsibility.5 In both instances, the 
legislature has responded in a more limited fashion than was suggested 
by the Court's direction. Nevertheless, it has significantly broadened 
the liability of municipalities and landowners with respect to the rights 
of injured persons. 
§13.2. Governmental Immunity. The Survey year witnessed a re-
markable degree of activity in the area of governmental immunity from 
tort liability. The Supreme Judicial Court continued its frontal assault 
on the doctrine, impelling the General Court to enact a comprehensive 
scheme creating, but limiting, liability for the commonwealth and its 
political subdivisions in tort. A brief review of the Court's erosion of 
the doctrine will be followed by a discussion of the new statute. 
Until July of 1978, when the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act was 
enacted, 1 the commonwealth, with one exception, enjoyed absolute tort 
immunity. That one exception, as set forth in Morash & Sons v. Com-
"MICHAEL E. MONE is a partner in the Boston law firm of Esdaile, Barrett 
& Esdaile. 
""PATRICIA L. KELLY is an associate at Esda'ile, Barrett & Esdaile. 
§13.1 1 Acts of 1978, c. 512 adding new G.L. c. 258. 
2 See § 13.2 infra. 
a 363 Mass. 612, 296 N.E.2d 461 (1973). 
4 363 Mass. 693, 297 N .E.2d 43 ( 1973). 
5 363 Mass. at 618-19, 296 N.E.2d at 465; 363 Mass. at 706-09, 297 N.E.2d at 
51-53. 
§13.2. 1 Acts of 1978, c. 512, adding new G.L. c. 258. 
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monwealth,2 imposed liability on the commonwealth for creating a pri-
vate nuisance resulting in damage to the property of another.3 Munici-
palities were similarly liable for the creation of such nuisances, as well 
as for torts which arose out of proprietary activities.4 Municipalities, 
however, enjoyed immunity for tortious conduct which resulted from 
governmental activities.5 Morash criticized this governmental-proprietary 
distinction as having "no necessary relationship to accepted tort prin-
ciples, equitable principles, or principles of sound public policy." 6 
Although the Supreme Judicial Court in Morash expressed its senti-
ment that the governmental immunity doctrine was no longer defensible,7 
the Court refrained from judicial abrogation, stating that comprehensive 
legislative action abrogating the doctrine was preferable.8 With the 
passage of four years and the legislature's continued failure to act, the 
Supreme Judicial Court in Whitney v. City of Worcester,9 heralded its 
final warning, declaring its intention to abrogate state, county, and mu-
nicipal immunity in the next appropriate case if the legislature had not 
dealt with the matter by the end of the 1978 legislative session.10 In 
addition, it stated that judicial abrogation of governmental immunity, 
if it were to occur, would be applied retroactively to all injuries occurring 
after the publication date of Morash. 11 
Shortly after Whitney, the Court, in Feldman v. City of WorcesterP 
acted in accordance with its stated intention to abrogate retroactively 
governmental immunity if the legislature refused to act by the end of 
the 1978 legislative session. The complaint in Feldman alleged that the 
negligent administration of medication and external cardiac massage by 
the city's agents in a municipal hospital in October of 1973 was the 
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.13 Although the operation of 
a hospital is a governmental function and hence would fall within the 
area of conduct traditionally protected by governmental immunity, the 
Court refused to apply the doctrine.14 Instead, it reversed the dismissal 
of the action and remanded the case to the superior court to await 
action by the legislature in accordance with Whitney. 15 
2 363 Mass. 612, 296 N.E.2d 461 (1973). 
3 Id. at 616, 296 N.E.2d at 463-64. 
4 Id. 
o Id. 
6 Id. at 621, 296 N.E.2d at 467. 
7 Id. at 618, 296 N.E.2d at 465. 
s Id. at 624, 296 N.E.2d at 468. 
9 373 Mass. 208, 366 N.E.2d 1210 (1977). 
1o Id. at 210, 366 N.E.2d at 1212. 
11 I d. at 225, 366 N .E.2d at 1220. 
12 373 Mass. 276, 366 N.E.2d 1239 ( 1977). 
13 Id. at 277, 366 N.E.2d at 1240. 
14 Id. at 278, 366 N.E.2d at 1241. 
15 Id. 
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In the closing days of the 1978 session, the legislature finally responded 
to the Court's admonition in Whitney by enacting a total revision of 
General Laws chapter 258, thereby creating a tort claims act. Contrary 
to the judicial intent, as expressed in Whitney, that abrogation should 
apply to all causes of action arising on or after the 1973 Morash deci-
sion, 16 the Act is applicable only to causes of action arising on or after 
August 16, 1977, the date of the Whitney decisionP It appears the 
General Court considered that public entities were entitled to rely on 
the doctrine of governmental immunity until Whitney was decided and 
not, as the Court felt, only until the time Morash was decided in 1973.18 
Whenever American jurisdictions have abolished governmental im-
munity, whether judicially or legislatively, they have at the same time 
uniformly recognized the need to limit liability. Specified torts such as 
conduct involving a particular state of mind of the public employee and 
legislative, judicial, or discretionary activities or functions are frequently 
excepted from liability. Even where liability exists, damages are often 
limited by establishing a maximum recoverable judgment, disallowing 
recovery for punitive damages, or requiring the subtraction of collateral 
benefits. Procedural limitations, such as the requirement of giving notice 
to a specified official within a designated period of time, are also fre-
quently imposed. The abrogation of traditional common law immunity 
in the exercise of governmental functions has expanded to all states 
except Maryland and South Dakota.19 
Some states have not explicitly abolished immunity but have permitted 
or mandated the purchase of liability insurance. Generally, exercising 
this option constitutes a waiver of immunity to the extent that the 
insurance coverage has been procured.20 Even if a state has explicitly 
abolished the doctrine, it may still authorize governmental units to pur-
chase insurance to cover liability, even though in the absence of insur-
ance, the unit would not be liable.21 
The general grant of liability to suit in chapter 258 is that the public 
employer "shall be liable for injury or loss of property or personal injury 
or death . . . in the same manner and to the same extent as a private 
individual under like circumstances .... " 22 This language is essentially 
the same as the language of the Federal Tort Claims Act,23 on which 
16 See text at note 11 supra. 
17 Acts of 1978, c. 512, § 16. 
18 373 Mass. at 225, 366 N.E.2d at 1219-20. 
19 K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25 at 207 (1st ed. Supp. 1980). 
2o Lambert, Tort Law, 35 A.T.L.A.L.J. 33, 36 (1979). 
21 Id. 
22 Acts of 1978, c. 512, § 15, adding new G.L. c. 258, § 2. 
23 28 u.s.c. §§ 2671-80 (1976). 
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the Massachusetts Act was largely patterned. It has been interpreted 
to mean that if a theory of liability exists applicable to the governmental 
entity as if it were a private individual, then the governmental entity 
will be held liable.24 Numerous states have also defined the scope of 
governmental liability according to this same "private individual" 
standard. 211 
Section 10 of chapter 258 sets out four exceptions to liability of the 
public employer, which to a large extent were taken from the federal 
legislation. These exceptions are: 
( 1) claims arising out of conduct while exercising due care in 
the execution of a statute, regulation, or ordinance, regardless of 
whether the statute, regulation, or ordinance is valid; 
( 2) claims based upon the performance of a discretionary function 
by a public employee who is acting within the scope of his employ-
ment regardless of whether the discretion is abused; 
( 3) claims arising out of an intentional tort I all the intentional 
torts are specifically mentioned]; 
( 4) claims arising out of the assessment or collection of taxes or 
the lawful detention of goods by a law enforcement off:i.cer.26 
Several states have enacted nearly identical provisions; these statutes 
assume total liability as the rule and then establish certain types of 
activities as exceptions to liability.27 
An initial question arises as to whether the liability of the state is the 
same as or different from the liability imposed on local governmental 
bodies. Generally, liability of local governmental bodies is broader than . 
liability of the states. This calls to mind the old rule that the state 
enjoyed an absolute immunity, but the municipality enjoyed a qualified 
immunity, extending to governmental but not to proprietary functions.28 
24 Indiana Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64 ( 1955). 
:u; See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 4-160 (a); WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 4.92.090. 
26 Acts of 1978, c. 512, § 15, adding new G.L. c. 258, § 10. 
27 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250; HAw. REv. STAT. § 662-15; IowA CoDE 
ANN. § 25A-14(i); NEB. REv. STAT. § 23-2409. 
28 Massachusetts, along with most states, no longer makes the distinction be-
tween governmental and proprietary functions. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 4-160; IDAHO CoDE§ 6-904(i); WAsH. REv. STAT. § 4.92.090; Lorence v. Hospital 
Bd. of Morgan County, 294 Ala. 614, 617, 320 So.2d 631, 633 ( 1975); Gorrel v. 
City of Parsons, 223 Kan. 645, 649-50, 576 P.2d 616, 619-20 ( 1978); Whitney v. 
City of Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 214-15, 366 N.E.2d 1210, 1214-15. Some juris-
dictions still adhere to the distinction, assuming liability for torts which arise out of 
proprietary activities. See, e.g., MICH . .STAT. ANN .. § 691.140; UTAH CoDE ANN. 
§ 63-30-3; Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 802, 473 P.2d 937, 944 ( 1970); Biello 
v. Pennsylvania Liquor Bd., 454 Pa. 179, 301 A.2d 849 ( 1973) (applying distinc-
tion to state liability) . 
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Today Connecticut, Vermont, and North Carolina represent the view that 
the state faces broader liability than the municipalities.29 The Massa-
chusetts Tort Claims Act, like legislation in several other states,30 draws 
no distinction between the commonwealth on one hand, and municipali-
ties, commissions, and districts on the other hand.31 
The first exception to liability set forth in section 10 of chapter 258 
is that a public employer will not be held liable for harm caused by 
an employee in the execution of a statute, regulation, ordinance, or by-
law, whether or not the statute, regulation, ordinance, or by-law is 
reasonable or valid. Other jurisdictions have similar provisions;32 those 
jurisdictions which do not recognize a similar exception have based their 
decisions finding liability on the fact that potential liability tends to 
encourage proper performance of a statutorily prescribed ministerial 
duty.aa 
The second, and most important, exception to liability is the so-called 
discretionary function exception. Cases interpreting this exception under 
the Federal Tort Claims Act frequently draw a distinction between 
planning and operational level functions, finding liability only when 
tortious conduct arises out of operational level decisions. This distinc-
tion was elaborated upon in Swanson v. United States: 34 
The planning level notion refers to decisions involving questions of 
policy, that is, the evaluation of factors such as financial, political, 
economic, and social effects of a given plan or policy . . . . The 
operational level decisions, on the other hand, involve decisions 
relating to the normal day-to-day operations of government.35 
The Supreme Judicial Court in Whitney also listed inquiries that would 
be relevant in determining whether conduct would fall within the dis-
cretionary function exception: 
Was the injury-producing conduct an integral part of the govern-
mental policymaking or planning? Might the imposition of tort 
liability jeopardize the quality and efficiency of the governmental 
29 See K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 25 at 553-54 (1st ed. 
Supp. 1976). 
30 See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 4-160; IDAHO CoDE REv. § 6-904(i); WAsH. REv. 
CODE § 4.92.090. 
31 See Acts of 1978, c. 512, § 15, adding new G.L. c. 258, § 1, which contains 
a broad definition of the term "public employer," but excludes several authorities. 
32 See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 30.265(3). 
33 See, e.g., Dalton v. Hysell, 56 Ohio App. 2d 109, 110, 381 N.E.2d 955, 956 
( 1978) (liability of court clerk for failure properly to enter record payment of 
plaintiff's fine, contrary to a duty imposed by statute.) 
34 229 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Cal. 1964). 
35 ld. at 220. 
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process? Could a judge or jury review the conduct in question 
without usurping the power and responsibility of the legislative or 
executive branches? Is there an alternate remedy available to the 
injured individual other than an action for damages . . . . [O]ther 
relevant considerations are the reasonable expectations of the in-
jured person with respect to his relationship to the governmental 
entity in question, the nature of the duty running from the govern-
ment to the governed in the particular case, and the nature of the 
injury.36 
In defining the scope of governmental liability, nearly every state, by 
judicial or legislative action, has excepted liability for tortious conduct 
arising in the course of the performance of discretionary activities. The 
rationale behind the exception is that it " ... is essential to a good 
system of law on governmental tort liability, but the exception should 
not be pushed beyond the reasons behind it." 37 
Depending upon which analysis is employed in the jurisdiction, the 
determination of whether a particular activity is discretionary will vary. 
For example, courts have generally held that the basic decision to release 
a prisoner on parole is a discretionary function involving policy consid-
erations that compel immunity from judicial review.38 However, in 
Rieser v. District of Columbia,39 the conduct of a parole officer in failing 
to disclose the dangerous propensities of a parolee to his employer was 
found not to be discretionary. In its decision the court reasoned that 
potential liability would encourage conscientious performance.40 In 
State v. Silva,41 the court held that the establishment of a work release 
program for prisoners and the selection of inmates for the program were 
discretionary but that the manner in which the camp was supervised 
and controlled was mainly operational.42 Rieser, like Silva, involved the 
implementation and supervision of the parole program; they thus are 
distinguishable from those cases which hold that the selection of prisoners 
for a parole program falls within the discretionary function exception. 
The third exception of section 10 is for intentional torts by employees 
and agents of the public employer. This exception, like that in statutes 
of other states,43 is taken practically verbatim from the federal Act.44 
36 373 Mass. at 219-20, 366 N.E.2d at 1217. 
37 K.C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 25.18 at 870 (1st ed. Supp. 
1970). 
38 Adamo v. State, 46 Ohio Misc. 1, 345 N.E.2d 661 ( 1975). 
39 563 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
40 Id. at 475. 
41 86 Nev. 911, 478 P.2d 591 ( 1971). 
42 Id. at 913, 478 P.2d at 593. 
43 See ALASKA STAT. § 09.250(3); HAw. REv. STAT. § 662-15(4); IowA CoDE 
ANN. § 25a.l4(4); NEB. REv. STAT. § 23-2409(5). 
44 28 u.s.c. § 2680(h) (1976). 6
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Police conduct involving excessive force would probably fall within the 
intentional torts exception. In states abrogating governmental immunity, 
but failing to except intentional torts, the public employer would prob-
ably be liable for unreasonable arrest and imprisonment. 
Certain conduct attributable to negligent execution of police proce-
dures would in all likelihood sound in negligence and not fall within 
the intentional tort or discretionary activities exception. Thus, noncom-
pliance with statutory requirements for adequate police training 45 would 
give rise to liability. In Carter v. Carlson,46 a federal appeals court held 
that failure to provide adequate training and supervision of police of-
ficers did not necessarily fall within the discretionary function excep-
tion.47 Although jurisdictions are not in agreement as to whether the 
initial police decision to stop or pursue a suspected wrongdoer falls 
within the discretionary function exception, there is uniformity among 
jurisdictions that, absent a specific statutory exception excluding this 
activity from liability, a pursuit executed negligently will give rise to 
liability.48 Some statutes have specifically excepted from immunity the 
negligent operation of motor vehicles; in those jurisdictions, police negli-
gence in a chase would give rise to liability.49 In Massachusetts, such 
conduct would be actionable because it falls within the general rule of 
liability. The legislature has amended chapter 41, section 100, so that 
municipalities will indemnify police officers or firefighters for expenses 
and damages incurred in the defense or settlement of claims against 
them for acts done while operating a motor vehicle in their capacity as 
a police officer or firefighter. 
The question arises whether the failure to provide police protection 
will give rise to liability for harm resulting from the lack of protection. 
In those jurisdictions that continue governmental immunity for discre· 
tionary acts, or provide a specific statutory exception, 50 courts have 
consistently held that the failure to provide police protection will not 
45 See G.L. c. 41, § 96B. 
46 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
47 Id. at 368. 
48 See, e.g., Mason v. Bitton, 85 Wash. 2d 321, 328, 534 P.2d 1360, 1365 ( 1975) 
(The decision whether to chase and continue in pursuit is operational and not a 
basic policy decision); Sparks v. City of Compton, 64 Cal. App. 3d 592, 596, 134 
Cal. Rptr. 684, 686-87 ( 1976) (Although the original decision to stop or pursue is 
deemed discretionary, negligence in the execution of the act might give rise to 
liability); But cf. Cole v. Rife, 77 Mich. App. 545, 553, 258 N.W.2d 555, 558 ( 1977) 
(Municipality, but not individual officer, may claim the protection of sovereign 
immunity from claims of negligence in setting up a roadblock). 
49 See, e.g., TENN. CoDE ANN. § 23-3308; UTAH CoDE ANN. § 63-30-7. 
50 CAL. Gov'T CoDE § 884.6 (West) (no liability for injury to prisoners); 
Jamison v. City of Chicago, 48 Ill. App. 3d 567, 363 N.E.2d 87 (1977) (interpret-
ing ILL. REv. STAT. c. 85, §§ 4-104, 4-107). 
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give rise to liability. The reason for the courts' refusal to impose liability 
is known as the public duty doctrine. This doctrine holds that police 
protection is owed to the public generally and not to a particular in-
dividual.51 Where, however, a specific duty to provide protection is 
assumed toward a particular individual, it must be executed in a non-
negligent manner; otherwise liability will result.112 
The public duty doctrine is not limited to police protection. Other 
activities to which it is frequently applied and which therefore would 
not give rise to liability are the pmtision of fire protection services,113 
the inspection of buildings,54 and the issuance of building permits.1111 
Specific statutory exceptions from liability exist in some jurisdictions for 
these activities and provide immunity without reliance on a public duty 
rationale.56 Since the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act does not have 
any such provisions, the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions 
will avoid liability for these activities based upon the public duty 
doctrine.57 Again, some jurisdictions that apply the public duty doctrine 
to these activities hold that when a specific duty is undertaken with 
respect to a particular individual, it must be executed in a non-negligent 
manner.58 
In enacting the new statute, the General Court explicitly retained 
chapter 84, sections 15-25, which govern actions arising out of defective 
municipal streets, and chapter 81, section 18, which governs actions 
51 See, e.g., Massengil v. Yuma County, 1061 Ariz. 518, 523, 456 P.2d 376, 378 
( 1969); Supsons Food Fair, Inc. v. City of Evansville, 149 Ind. App. 394-95, 272 
N.E.2d 871, 875 ( 1971); Riss v. New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 581-82, 240 N.E.2d 860, 
862, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 898 (1968). 
52 See e.g., Hargrove v. Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130, 133-34 (Fla. 1957) (liability 
for negligently leaving prisoner unattended in his cell after a fire broke out); Schus-
ter v. New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 84-86, 154 N.E.2d 534, 539-40, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265, 
272-73 ( 1958) (liability for failure to provide proper police protection to informant). 
53 See, e.g., Stietz v. Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 54, 64 N.E.2d 704, 707 (1945). 
But see Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976) (liability for failure to en-
force fire safety codes ) . 
54 Duran v. City of Tucson, 20 Ariz. App. 22, 27, 509 P.2d 1059, 1063, ( 1973); 
Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 138, 204 N.E.2d 635, 636, 256 
N.Y.S.2d 595, 597 ( 1965). 
55 Modlin v. City of Miami Beach, 201 So.2d 70, 75 (Fla. 1967); Hoffert v. 
Owatonna Inn Towne Motel, Inc., 293 Minn. 220, 222-23, 109 N.W.2d 158, 160 
( 1972). 
56 TENN. CoDE ANN. § 23-3311(3) (no liability for issuance of licenses or 
permits); I d. § 23-3311 ( 4) (no liability for failure to make an adequate inspec-
tion). 
57 See Reynolds Boat Co. v. City of Haverhill, 357 Mass. 668, 669, 260 N.E.2d 
176, 17~ ( 1970) (duty of municipality is to provide firefighting services to the 
commumty at large and not to its members individually). 
. 
5~ See, e;g., In Re M/T Alv~ Gap~, 405 F.2d 962 ( 2d Cir. 1969) (reversing 
d1stnct courts grant of defendants motion for summary judgment in case of negli-
gence in fighting shipboard fire). 
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ansmg out of defective state highways.59 Section 15 of chapter 84 
limits recovery to actions arising out of defects in municipal property 
that can be considered a public way. The municipality must have had 
reasonable or constructive notice of the defect, which defect could have 
been corrected by the exercise of reasonable care.60 Recovery is ex-
pressly precluded where the injury is sustained because of snow or ice 
upon a public way, if the public way was otherwise reasonably safe,61 
or sustained during construction or repair, if the way has been closed 
and sufficient means have been taken to caution the public against 
entering.62 As in Bancroft v. Town of Canterbury,63 however, recovery 
will now be allowed for injuries caused by "tortious municipal con-
duct in constructing and/ or maintaining a barrier to a discontinued 
bridge ... " 64 or public way. The statute has been construed to deny 
recovery unless the defect is the sole cause of the injury 65 or unless 
a third person's conduct contributing to the injury was innocent.66 
It appears that chapter 229, section 1, which sets a $4,000 limit on 
recovery for wrongful death actions against municipalities arising out 
of defective public ways, is no longer in force. The Massachusetts Tort 
Claims Act specifically refers to death as a compensable loss. 67 Since 
the statute does not refer to chapter 229, section 1, and provides that 
"[a]ny other provision of law inconsistent with any other provisions of 
the chapter shall not apply, ... " 68 it appears that chapter 229, sec-
tion 1, has been impliedly repealed. Thus, where death results from 
a defective public way municipalities will be liable under the general 
Massachusetts Wrongful Death statute.69 Judgments will be limited to 
$100,000 and no recovery will be permitted for punitive damages,70 even 
though the wrongful death statute would permit punitive damages.71 
Chapter 81, section 18, which applies to state highways, incorporates 
by reference the provisions of chapter 84, sections 15, 18, and 19, with 
59 Acts of 1978, c. 512, § 18 provides: 
The provisions of this act shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment 
of the purposes thereof but shall not be construed to supersede or repeal sec-
tion eighteen of chapter eighty-one and sections fifteen to twenty-five, inclu-
sive, of chapter eighty-four of the General Laws. Any other provision of law 
inconsistent with any other provisions of this chapter shall not apply. 
60 G.L. c. 84, § 15. 
61 Id. § 17. 
62 Id. § 15 .. 
63 118 N.H. 453, 388 A.2d 199 (1978 ). 
64 Id. at 458, 388 A.2d at 203. 
65 Carroll v. City of Lowell, 321 Mass. 98, 71 N.E.2d 763 (1947). 
66 Clinton v. City of Revere, 195 Mass. 151, 80 N.E.2d 813 ( 1907). 
67 Acts of 1978, c. 512, § 15 adding new G.L. c. 258, § 2. 
68 See note 60 supra. 
69 G.L. c. 229, § 2. 
70 Acts of 1978, c. 512, § 15 adding new G.L. c. 258, § 2. 
71 See G.L. c. 229, § 2. 
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the result that the preceding analysis will apply to such actions against 
the commonwealth. Chapter 81, section 18, however, limits recovery 
to $4,000 and precludes liability where the injury is sustained because 
of the lack of a railing on a highway, from a defective sidewalk, or 
during construction or repair of the highway. Since chapter 229, section 
1, did not apply to the commonwealth, wrongful death recovery will be 
permitted without superseding any statute. Other jurisdictions have 
held that the negligent planning of a highway is not a discretionary 
act and does give rise to liability.72 Some state tort claims statutes 
explicitly allow recovery for injuries caused by the dangerous conditions 
of public ways.73 In Massachusetts, however, negligent planning or 
design of a highway would likely be considered a defect recoverable 
only under chapter 84, sections 15-25, or chapter 81, section 18. 
The new act does not specifically protect the public employer from 
liability for attractive nuisance. Chapter 231, section 850, gives a 
trespasser of young age a cause of action against a possessor of land 
who maintains an artificial condition thereon and fails to exercise rea-
sonable care to protect the trespassing child from injury sustained from 
the artificial condition. Since chapter 231, section 850, is not mentioned 
in the new statute and is not inconsistent with its terms, recovery under 
the attractive nuisance principle will presumably be allowed against 
governmental landowners. 
Section 2 of chapter 258 provides that the public employer shall not 
be liable in excess of $100,000. The Massachusetts comparative negli-
gence statute 74 provides that the gross amount of damages will be 
diminished in proporti.on to the amount of the plaintiff's negligence and 
denies recovery if plaintiff's negligence is greater than the defendant's. 
The $100,000 figure recoverable under the Tort Claims Act is apparently 
the net recovery once the amount attributable to the comparative negli-
72 Grun v. State, No. 59974 (New York Court of Claims Sept. 21, 1978) (li-
ability for negligent failure to clean sand, gravel, and dirt along highway); Reinert 
v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Transportation, 482 Pa. 612, 394 A.2d 490 ( 1978) ( liabil-
ity for failure to design and construct state highways with a median guard rail); 
Jezek v. City of Midland, No. 27, 349 (Midland District Court, Texas, February 3, 
1978) (city liable for negligent failure to remove visually obstructing brush and 
trees from roadside); Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975) (While decision 
to build highway was discretionary, preparation of plans and specifications and 
supervision of construction was not discretionary.) But see Smith v. Cooper, 256 
Ore. 485, 475 P.2d 78 ( 1970) (no liability for negligent planning and designing 
of highway). 
73 See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CoDE § 835 (West) (liability of public entities for 
dangerous conditions of public property), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-6 (West) (in-
corporates high standard~ of governmental culpability and excludes recovery for 
negligent highway design); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 23-3309 (no immunity for unsafe 
streets or highways; must be actual or constructive notice of unsafe condition). 
74 G.L. c. 231, § 85. 
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gence of the plaintiff has been deducted from the damages assessed 
against the tortfeasor. 
Many jurisdictions have limited governmental liability by establishing 
maximum recoverable judgments. These maximum judgments are gen-
erally categorized on a per claimant basis, a per incident basis, or both 75 
and sometimes according to the type of damage 76 or the activity out 
of which the tort arose.77 Some statutes also authorize the governmental 
unit to purchase insurance against tort liability which will cover liability 
for judgments in excess of statutory limits.78 Although the act limits 
liability to $100,000, it does not indicate whether this is a per claimant 
or or per incident limitation. The lack of qualifying language 79 implies 
that each claimant may recover up to $100,000. Section 8 of the act 
authorizes public employers to procure tort liability insurance "for pay-
ment of damages incurred pursuant to this chapter." 80 By this language 
it appears that the $106,000 recovery limit will still apply even though 
insurance is procured. 81 
The act provides a specific procedure for the settlement of claims 
against public employers. The "executive officer" 82 of the public em-
ployer may settle a claim for $2,500 or less within six months of the 
date when the claim is presented.83 If the proposed settlement exceeds 
$2,500, there must be prior approval by the public employer's "public 
attorney." 84 When the public employer is the commonwealth, settle-
ments in excess of $20,000 must also have the prior approval of the 
75 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28 ( $50,000 per claim, $100,000 per occur-
rence); ILL. REv. STAT. c. 37, § 4398 (Court of Claims granted jurisdiction over 
tort claims, which may not exceed $100,000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.04(a) 
( $100,000 per claim, $300,000 per incident for torts of local governments); NEv. 
STAT. REv.§ 41.035 ($25,000 maximum judgment); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5601 
( $75,000 per claimant, $300,000 per occurrence). 
76 See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 30.270 ( $20,000 for property damage, $50,000 
for other claims, $300,000 per occurrence); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 
($10,000 for property damage, $100,000 per person, $300,000 per occurrence). 
77 See R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 9-21-2, 9-21-3 ( $50,000 maximum recovery not appli-
cable where tort is committed in course of proprietary function). 
78 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.06. 
79 Acts of 1978, c. 512, § 15, adding new G.L. c. 258, § 2 merely provides in 
this regard that "public employers shall not be liable . . . for any amount in 
excess of one hundred thousand dollars." 
80 Acts of 1978, c. 512, § 15 adding new G.L. c. 258, § 8. 
81 But see Delong v. City & County of Denver, 195 Colo. 27, 576 P.2d 539 
( 1978) where the court held that a statute limiting amount of recova-y against a 
governmental entity was not in conflict with a city charter provision abrogating 
immunity and placing no limit on the award; recovery would not be limited to 
the ceiling established by the state statute. 
82 A term defined in Acts of 1978, c. 512, § 15 adding new G.L. c. 258, § 1. 
83 Acts of 1978, c. 512, § 15 adding new G.L. c. 258, § 5. 
84 Id. "Public attorney" is defined in id. § 1. 
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Secretary of Administration and Finance.85 Additionally, if a civil action 
has been brought on the claim, any settlement in excess of $20,000 must 
have the prior approval of a judge of the superior court having jurisdic-
tion over the action.86 These procedural restraints for settlements in 
excess of certain amounts are not as restrictive as statutes in other juris-
dictions which impose absolute ceilings on settlements that are signi-
ficantly lower than the potential recovery if the case went to trial.87 
In order to commence a civil action against a public employer under 
chapter 258, the claimant must have presented his claim in writing to 
the executive officer of the public employer within two years of the 
date when the cause of action arose. 88 Within six months of present-
ment of the claim, the executive officer may pay it, deny it, refer it to 
arbitration or settle it. Failure to deny, refer to arbitration, or settle 
within six months will be deemed to be a final denial of the claim.89 
If the claim has not been settled within six months of presentment, the 
claimant may commence suit.90 The action under the general tort statute 
of limitations 91 may be brought up to three years after the date when 
the cause of action accrued even though written presentment to the 
executive officer must occur within two years.92 
Many jurisdictions have notice requirements which are generally 
shorter than the applicable statute of limitations. Some of these statutes 
with extremely short notice requirements, ranging from two to six months, 
have been challenged and determined to be unconstitutional as a denial 
of equal protection and due process.93 In one case, however, a ninety 
day county notice requirement, which stood in contrast to a six month 
85 Id. § 5. 
86 Id. § 7. 
87 See, e.g., D.C. CoDE ENcYcL. § 1-904 ( $10,000 maximum amount pennitted 
for settlement of tort claim; no apparent limit to judgment recovery). 
88 Acts of 1978, c. 512, § 15 adding new G.L. c. 258, § 4. 
89 Id. 
oo Id. 
91 G.L. c. 260, § 2A. 
92 Acts of 1978, c. 512, § 15 adding new G.L. c. 258, § 4. 
93 Reich v. State Highway Dept., 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (197.2) 
(MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1404; 60 day state notice requirement); Turner 
v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 845 (1975) (NEV. REv. STAT.§§ 244.245, 244.250; 
190 day county notice. requirement); Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 
Wash.2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 ( 1975) (WAsH. REv. CoDE § 4.96.0.20; 120 day notice 
requirement). A rationale in support of these decisions is that 
since the legislature had waived the immunity of governmental units it made 
clear an intent to put all tortfeasors on an equal footing. The notice provision 
frustrated that intent by setting up different classes of tortfeasors (public and 
private) and tort victims. Such planned discrimination from dual classification 
of tortfeasors and their victims inevitably foundered on the equal protection 
condemnation of individious classifications. 
Lambert, Tort Law, 36 A.T.L.A.L.J. 20, 33 (1976). 
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notice requirement for municipalities and a one year notice requirement 
for the state, was held to be constitutional.1H The Utah Supreme Court 
reasoned that the "legislature has wide discretion in enacting laws which 
affect one group of citizens differently than other groups. The constitu-
tional safeguard of equal protection is offended only if the classification 
rests upon the ground not relative to the state's objective." 95 The Massa-
chusetts two year notice requirement is not unreasonably short in com-
parison to the three year tort statute of limitations. Therefore, an equal 
protection challenge to the Massachusetts notice requirement would be 
weaker than a similar challenge to those statutes having two to six month 
notice requirements. 
Prior to the enactment of chapter 258, many public employees were 
personally liable only for injuries caused by their own misfeasance. 
Chapter 258, section 2, makes no distinction between misfeasance and 
nonfeasance and provides that a public employee while acting within 
the scope of his employment is not liable as long as he cooperates in 
the defense of any claim. If the employee does not cooperate, he faces 
the risk of being held jointly liable in the action for negligence. Certain 
conduct of enumerated professions, however, has been statutorily ex-
cepted from liability. Under chapter 112, section 12B, and chapter 71, 
section 55, the "Good Samaritan Rule" that a person under no duty to 
act will be held liable if he acts negligently,96 is inapplicable under 
certain circumstances to physicians, registered nurses, public school 
teachers, principals, and school nurses. Under the 1977 enactment of 
chapter 111C, section 14, the exceptions to the "Good Samaritan Rule'' 
have been extended to certified medical technicians, police officers, and 
firefighters. Thus, any such person who "in the performance of his 
duties and in good faith, renders emergency first aid or transportation 
to an injured person" shall not in any way be personally liable as a 
result of rendering such aid or providing transportation.97 Since these 
provisions are not inconsistent with the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, 
any person whose conduct falls within one of these statutory exceptions 
will remain immune from liability regardless of his status as a public 
employee. 
Where, however, a public employee has committed an intentional tort 
of a civil rights violation, the employee may be subject to personal 
liability regardless of his employment status or his willingness to co-
operate with the defense of claims against the government. 98 In such 
94 Crowder v. Salt Lake County, 552 P.2d 646, 648 (Utah 1976). 
95 I d. at 647 (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 ( 1961)). 
96 Black v. New York, N.H., & H. RR. Co., 193 Mass. 488, 79 N.E. 797 (1907). 
97 G.L. c. ll1C, § 14 added by Acts of 1977, c. 649. 
98 Acts of 1978, c. 512, § 15 adding new G.L. c. 258, § 9. 
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cases, public employers are authorized to provide inde~nification of up 
to $1,000,000 for losses and expenses sustained by the employee during 
his defense.99 Indemnification, however, will only be~ available when 
the employee's action was within the scope of his employment.100 More-
over, an employer may not indemnify an employee for claims resulting 
from willful, malicious, or grossly negligent conduct.101 Several other 
jurisdictions provide for compulsory indemnification of an employee held 
liable in tort. In many of these jurisdictions indemnification is condi-
tioned on the standard of care exercised by the employee.102 Some 
jurisdictions forbid indemnification in such instances, 103 ! and other juris-
dictions permit, but do not mandate, indemnification.104 i 
The Massachusetts Tort Claims Act is a welcome rectgnition that the 
sovereign can do wrong and should be responsible for it~ damages. The 
commonwealth, at the constant prodding of the Supreme Judicial Court, 
has finally been brought in line with the humanitarian approach of the 
federal government and the vast majority of state governments. It 
remains to be seen how the new act will be construed, but it is a safe 
guess that the Supreme Judicial Court will in future cases apply the 
analysis it set forth in Whitney. 
§13.3. Collateral Source Rule. It is well settled ip Massachusetts 
that a tortfeasor's liability to an injured person is not! reduced by the 
amount of compensation received by the injured persort pursuant to an 
insurance policy.1 This principle, commonly known as the collateral 
source rule, had been applied intact in this state until this Survey year, 
when the Supreme Judicial Court carved out the first exceptions to the 
rule in ]ones v. Town of Wayland. 2 Jones, the plaintiff, was a police 
officer who had been struck in the left temple by a rock as he was driving 
in his police cruiser.3 Jones received compensation under the Wayland 
group health and accident insunmce policy.4 Jones als~ sought further 
payments from Wayland under General Laws chapter 4~, section 111F.5 
I 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CoDE § 825 (scope of employment); CoLo. REv. STAT. 
§ 24-10-110; CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-165; § 7-465 (scope of employment; not 
wanton or willful conduct); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28(9); IowA CoDE ANN. 
§ 613A.8; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:10-1 & 10-2. 
103 See, e.g., IDAHO ConE ANN. § 6-903. 
104 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.07; OR. REv. STAT. § 30.285; S.D. CoMP. 
LAws ANN. §§ 3-19-1 to 3-19-3. 
§13.3. 1 Shea v. Rettie, 287 Mass. 454, 457-58, 192 N.E. 44, 45 (1934). 
2 Jones v. Town of Wayland, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 157, 373 N.E.2d 199. 
3 Id. at 159, 373 N.E.2d at 202. 
4 Id. at 161, 373 N.E.2d at 203. 
li Id. at 157, 373 N.E.2d at 201. 
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That statute provides that a police officer or firefighter who is inca-
pacitated because of injuries sustained without fault of his own in the 
performance of his duties is entitled to leave without loss of pay until he 
resigns or retires. Wayland contended that it should be allowed to deduct 
from any payments due under section lllF the amounts paid to Jones 
under the town's group insurance policy.6 
The Supreme Judicial Court, referring to the collateral source rule 
and its rationale, stated that "if there is to be a windfall [due to the 
fact that plaintiff is insured for the loss] such benefit should accrue to 
the injured party rather than to the wrongdoer." 7 . It determined that 
the rule is inapplicable in two situations: where the party liable to the 
injured person is not responsible for the injury and where the party found 
liable has established a fund to cover its liability to others.8 Both of 
these situations obtained in this instance because Wayland, though 
liable to Jones, was not a tortfeasor with respect to the injury and 
because the insurance payments were from a policy "most likely ac-
quired" by Wayland "with a view toward possible liability under 
§lllF." 9 The Court concluded that Wayland "should not be penalized 
for its foresight" 10 by being required to. duplicate the payments already 
made under the policy. Accordingly, it held that Wayland could deduct 
from payments made to Jones under section 111F insurance payments 
representing indemnity but could not deduct payments for loss of eye-
sight and medical expenses because these are not a duplication of 
section lllF payments.U 
§13.4. Medical Malpractice-Screening Tribunal-Constitutionality. 
In Austin v. Boston University Hospital,1 the Supreme Judicial Court 
answered questions certified to it by the U.S. District Court concerning 
the application and interpretation of chapter 231, section 60B, of the 
General Laws. This statute, which was to take effect on January 1, 
1976, requires a hearing before a tribunal prior to any medical mal-
practice action. The tribunal is to consist of a doctor, a lawyer, and 
a judge and is to "determine if the evidence presented if properly 
substantiated is sufficient to raise a legitimate question of liability 
appropriate for judicial inquiry or whether the plaintiff's case is merely 
an unfortunate medical result." 2 If it determines that the evidence is 
6 Id. at 172, 373 N.E.2d at 207. 
7 Id. at 173, 373 N.E.2d at 207, citing Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 1115, 1116 (1967); 
22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 206 (1965). 
s 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 173, 373 N.E.2d at 207-08. 
9 Id. at 173, 373 N.E.2d at 208. 
lo Id. 
11 Id. at 173-74, 373 N.E.2d at 208. 
§13.4. 1 372 Mass. 654, 363 N.E.2d 515 (1977). 
2 G.L. c. 231, § 60B, added by Acts of 1975, c.362, § 5. 15
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insufficient to substantiate the claim, plaintiff must post a $2,000 bond 
to cover defendant's costs and attorney's fees in the event plaintiff does 
not prevail in the litigation.3 
The first issue addressed by the Court was what the legislature meant 
by providing that the statute was to take effect on January 1, 1976. 
In Awnin, the complaint was filed on December 31, 1975, but the answer 
was not filed until after January 1, 1976.4 The Court determined that 
section OOB, in addition to providing procedural elements, also dealt 
with substantive rights in that it imposed liability for legal costs and 
expenses on unsuccessful litigants.11 Because of the substantive aspect 
of section BOB, the section should only apply to those cases to which 
the legislature clearly intended it to apply.6 Since appointment of the 
tribunal and a hearing is to occur within fifteen days after the defend-
ant's answer has been filed, the Court considered that it would be an 
overly broad construction of section BOB to make it applicable to all 
medical malpractice cases pending for which both the complaint and 
the answer had already been filed by January 1, 1976.7 The Court 
further determined that section 60B was not intended to apply to pend. 
ing medical malpractice actions for which answers had not yet been 
filed, since this interpretation would create problems in cases where 
one co-defendant had filed an answer before January 1, 1976, but another 
had not. 8 Thus, the Court concluded that section 60B is applicable 
to those medical malpractice cases in which both the complaint and 
answer were filed on or after January 1, 1976.9 
The second question addressed by Austin was what, if anything, 
should be done if a medical malpractice action is brought and remains 
in either the district or municipal court.10 Since section OOB provides 
that every medical malpractice action is to be heard by a tribunal, the 
Court ruled that such cases brought in a district or municipal court 
must be transferred to the superior court for a hearing by a section 60B 
tribunal.U Thereafter, the trial will be held in the appropriate mu-
nicipal or district court. Section BOB therefore does not give the su-
perior court exclusive jurisdiction over medical malpractice actions.12 
3 ld. 
4 372 Mass. at 656, 363 N.E.2d at 517. 
li Id. at 657-58, 363 N.E.2d at 517. 
6 Id. at 658, 363 N.E.2d at 517-18. 
7 Id. at 658, 363 N.E.2d at 518. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
1o Id. at -559, 363 N.E.2d at 518. 
11 Id. at 660, 363 N.E.2d at 519. 
12 Id. 
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The last question to which the Austin Court addressed itself dealt 
with the disposition of cases where the tribunal has found that "the 
plaintiff's case is merely an unfortunate medical result," and the plaintiff 
fails to file the $2,000 bond.13 The Court agreed that a judge may 
reduce the amount of the bond in the event of a plaintiff's indigency.1• 
It nevertheless held that, under section 60B, failure to post the required 
bond within thirty days of the tribunal's finding results in dismissal of 
the action.15 
In Paro v. Longwood H ospital 16 the Court considered challenges to 
the constitutionality of the section 60B procedure requiring screening 
of all medical malpractice complaints.n The suit also challenged the 
imposition of a bond for further prosecution, where the tribunal deter-
mined that a legitimate question of liability was not presented.18 The 
challenges were brought on equal protection, due process, and separa-
tion of powers grounds.19 
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected these constitutional challenges, 
holding first that there was a rational purpose for treating defendants 
differently from plaintiffs and medical malpractice cases differently from 
other tort cases.20 The legislative goal of section 60B was the elimina-
tion of unnecessary malpractice litigation and the assurance of the con-
tinued availability of malpractice insurance at reasonable cost.21 The 
plaintiffs did not contend that the classifications created ·by section 60B 
were inherently suspect or that they violated fundamental personal 
rights. Thus, the Court found no need to show a compelling state need 
in order to uphold the constitutionality of the statute.22 Applying the 
rational relation standard, the Court held that since the tribunal proce-
dure was a rational means to achieve these goals, the classifications 
created by the statute did not violate plaintiff's right to equal protec-
tion. 23 The Court further determined that since the judge is given wide 
discretion to determine the bond amount, there was no denial of equal 
protection as long as that discretion was exercised so as not to burden 
unduly meritorious claims.24 Moreover, the Court reasoned that since 
1s Id. at 661, 363 N.E.2d at 519. 
14 Id. 
111 Id. 
16 373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d at 985 (1977). 
17 Id. at 646-47, 369 N.E.2d at 986. 
18 Id. . 
19 Id. 
2o Id. at 648-49, 369 N.E.2d at 987-88. 
21 Id. at 651, 369 N.E.2d at 989. 
22 Id. at 650, 369 N.E.2d at 988-89. 
2a Id. at 651, 369 N.E.2d at 989. 
24 Id. at 652-53, 369 N.E.2d at 990. 
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the tribunal procedure only creates a limited obstruction to bringing 
a medical malpractice action, the substance of a plaintiff's jury trial 
right is not impaired. 25 Addressing itself to the separation of powers 
challenge, the Court pointed out that the tribunal's intimate connection 
with the judicial proceeding and the judge's preeminence in the entire 
process make it clear that the hearing is itself part of the judicial 
process and that the tribunal is not a legislative body.u Thus, the 
Court held that section 60B does not violate the separation of powers 
provision of the Massachusetts Constitution.27 
Where the matter involved in a negligence action is of a professional 
nature, such as a medical practice, expert evidence is usually necessary 
on the issues of whether the defendant was negligent and whether his 
negligence caused the plaintiff's harm. Under General Laws chapter 
233, section 79C, medical writings may be used in malpractice cases 
to supply the expert evidence. A preliminary finding of fact, however, 
must be made by the court before such writings may be introduced 
into evidence. .. The court must find that the author of the writing is 
recognized in his profession as an expert on the subject. In addition, 
the party intending to introduce the writing must give thirty days notice 
before the trial of his intention to introduce such evidence. 
In Mazzara v. Paull,28 the plaintiffs sought to introduce their expert 
evidence through examination of the defendant and through medical 
treatises under chapter 233, section 79C.29 The defendant, however, 
was unwilling to express his opinion on the qualifications and expertise 
of the authors of those treatises.30 The plaintiff later attempted to 
qualify the authors by introduction of the Directory of Medical Special-
ists.31 The judge excluded the directory, however.32 
On appeal, the plaintiff relied on chapter 233, section 79B, as grounds 
for the admissibility of the treatise.33 Section 79B provides that "Is]tate-
ments of facts of general interest to persons engaged in an occupation 
contained in a list, register, periodical, book or other compilation, issued 
to the public, shall, in the discretion of the court, if the court finds that 
the compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in that 
occupation and commonly is used and relied upon by them, be admis-
25 Id. at 655, 369 N.E.2d at 991. 
26 Id. at d57, 369 N.E.2d at 992. 
27 Id. 
28 372 Mass. 645, 363 N.E.2d 509 (1977). 
29 Id. at 646, 363 N.E.2d at 510. 
3o Id. at 646, 363 N.E.2d at 5ll. 
31 Id. at 647, 363 N.E.2d at 511. This directory is a part of the series known 
as Marquis Who's Who, Inc. Id. 
32 Id. at 647-48, 363 N.E.2d at 5ll. 
33 Id. at 649, 363 N.E.2d at 512. 
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sible in civil cases as evidence of the truth of any fact so stated." 84 
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the plaintiff's argument, citing 
Reddington v. Clayman,85 a case similar to Mazzaro in many respects. 
In Reddington a medical directory was held to be inadmissible for the 
purpose of proving the expertise of the authors of medical treatises.36 
As in Mazzaro, the directory was not offered below under chapter 233, 
section 79B. 37 Therefore, the judge could not make the preliminary 
findings necessary to introduce the directory,38 namely, that the com-
pilation be ( 1) issued to the public, ( 2) published for persons engaged 
in the applicable occupation, and ( 3) commonly used and relied upon 
by such persons.39 Since the plaintiff in Mazzaro did not make an offer 
of proof of these threshold requirements nor mention section 79B to 
the trial court as grounds for the admissibility of the directory, the 
Court held that exclusion of the directory was proper.40 In pointing 
out that perhaps the most expeditious way to prove these prerequisites 
is through the testimony of an expert who relied on the directory, the 
Court indicated that once the proper foundation for admission is laid, 
the trial judge could make the requisite preliminary findings, and the 
directory would be admissible in the judge's discretio'n.41 Although 
the Court did not address itself to whether the treatises would then 
have been admissible under section 79C, it is likely that once the 
qualifications and expertise of their authors had beet:t established, the 
text of the treatises would be admissible. 
In Harrington v. Cohen,42 the Appeals Court considered whether a 
doctor who had negligently pedormed a first operation could be found 
liable for damages resulting from a second operation when the second 
operation was pedormed, not to correct injuries resulting from the first, 
but to cure the patient's original condition.43 The defendant pedormed 
an initial unsuccessful spinal correction operation on the minor plaintiff, 
which was followed by an identical operation unsuccessfully pedormed 
by another doctor.44 Shortly after the second operation, the minor 
plaintiff developed a brain abscess which resulted in continuing epileptic 
type of seizures. 45 There was no evidence that the negligence of the 
84 G.L. c. 233, § 79B. 
35 334 Mass. 244, 134 N .E.2d at 920 ( 1956). 
36 Id. at 247, 134 N.E.2d at 922. 
37 Id. at 248, 134 N.E.2d at 922. 
38 Id. at 248, 134 N;E.2d at 923. 
ao G.L. c. 233, § 79B. 
40 372 Mass. at 652, 363 N.E.2d at 514. 
41 Id. 
42 1978 App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 339, 374 N.E.2d 344. 
43 Id. at 341, 374 N.E.2d at 345. 
44 Id. at 340, 374 N.E.2d at 345. 
411 Id. at 341, 374 N.E.2d at 345. 19
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first operation caused or contributed to injuries from the second opera-
tion.46 At trial, the judge ruled that if the defendant were found to 
be liable, damages assessed against him were to be limited to the first 
hospitalization and its resultant damages and were not to include the 
subsequent hospitalization and damages resulting from performance of 
the second orthopedic operation.47 
On appeal, the Appeals Court upheld the ruling of the trial judge. 
The plaintiff argued that the failure to perform successfully an unusually 
high risk operation foreseeably necessitated performing it a second time 
and thus foreseeably exposed the plaintiff twice to an unusual risk when 
the first operation was negligently performed.48 The court rejected this 
contention, noting that while multiple exposures to a risk of complica-
tions necessarily multiply the chance that the complications will occur, 
the risk on each subsequent exposure does not itself increase.49 The 
court remarked that as in the continuous flipping of a coin, "the odds 
are the same each time." 50 There was no evidence that the flrst opera-
tion created any propensity for complications nor that the plaintiff's con-
dition was made more severe or difficult to cure by the first operation. 51 
Thus, the complications that ensued from the second operation were 
caused by the plaintiff's condition and were in no way attributable to 
the first operation.52 Therefore, the defendant-doctor who performed 
the first operation should not be liable for the damages due to the 
complications which arose from the second operation.68 
§13.5. Defamation-Privilege-Truth as an Absolute Defense. The 
privilege defense in defamation actions is based upon the public policy 
that people must be free in certain situations to speak candidly without 
fear of being subjected to a defamation suit. Privileges are either ab-
solute or conditional depending upon the importance of the social need 
giving rise to the privilege. An absolute privilege shields a person from 
liability for a statement published maliciously or with knowledge of 
its falsity. It applies to statements of high public officials in the per-
formance of their duties, as well as to statements that are part of judicial 
proceedings.1 Massachusetts has adopted the view of the Restatement 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 342, 374 N.E.2d at 346. 
49 Id. at 342-43, 374 N.E.2d at 346. 
llO Id. at 343, 374 N.E.2d at 346. 
Ill Id. 
ll2 Id. 
liS Id. at 343-44, 374 N.E.2d at 346. 
§13.5. 1 Mezullo v. Maletz, 331 Mass. 233, 236, 118 N.E.2d 356, 358 ( 1954). 
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(Second) of Torts 2 and has extended the absolute privilege to state-
ments made by attorneys preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding. 8 
In Smith v. Suburban Restaurants, Inc., 4 the plaintiff brought a libel 
action against a restaurant based upon a copy of a letter sent by the 
defendant's attorney to the city police department. The contents of 
the letter, the original of which was sent to the plaintiff, informed her 
that she was no longer welcome on the restaurant premises and that 
any intrusions onto such premises would be considered a trespass for 
which legal action would be taken.l1 The defendant moved for summary 
judgment on the grounds that the contents of the letter were not sus-
ceptible of a defamatory meaning as a matter of law and tbat, in any 
case, the defendant's actions were absolutely privUeged.8 The trial court 
granted the defendant's motion and the plaintiff appealed.7 Disagreei.Dg 
with the trial court's finding that the letters could not be libelous, the 
Supreme Judicial Court reversed.8 
Addressing the issue of whether the words in the letter were libelous, 
the Court held that since the publication was susceptible to both a 
defamatory and a harmless meaning, the letter could not be found non-
libelous as a matter of law.9 Whether a publication is libelous, the 
Court ruled, presents a question for the trier of fact.10 The Court then 
considered the defendant's absolute privilege claim. It rejected thia 
claim on the grounds that "[t]he absolute privUege of an attorney to 
publish false and defamatory matter in communications preliminary to 
a proposed judicial proceeding applies only where the proceeding is 
contemplated in good faith and is under serious consideration." 11 The 
Court observed that since in this case any judicial proceeding was 
contingent upon some further conduct of the plaintiff, such a proceeding 
was neither contemplated in good faith nor was under serious considera-
tion.12 Finding, therefore, that the letter was not libelous as a matter 
of law and that the defendant was not absolutely privileged in sending 
2 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 586, ( 1938) provides: 
An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter con-
cerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceed-
ing, or in the institution of, or during the course and as a part of, a judicial 
proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it has some relation to the 
proceeding. 
3 Sriberg v. Raymond, 370 Mass. 105, 109, 345 N.E.2d 882, 884 (1976). 
4 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 531, 373 N.E.2d 215. 
5 Id. at 532, 373 N.E.2d at 217. 
8 Id. at 532, 373 N.E.2d at 216-17. 
7 Id. 
s Id. at 531, 373 N.E.2d at 217. 
9 Id. at 534, 373 N.E.2d at 217-18. 
1o Id. at 534, 373 N.E.2d at 218. 
11 Id. at 535, 373 N.E.2d at 218. 
12 Id. 21
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a copy of the letter to the police department, the Court reversed the 
trial court's order for summary judgment. 
In reaching this decision, the Court commented that under certain 
circumstances a good faith communication to the police may be condi-
tionally privileged.13 It noted that under chapter 266, section 120, of 
the General Laws, a person who, without right, enters a building "after 
having been forbidden so to do by the person who has the lawful 
control of the said premises, either directly or by notice posted 
thereon . . . " is guilty of a crime.l4 On the facts before it, however, 
the Court declined to find that sending the full text of the letter to 
the police was privileged as an assertion of the defendant's rights under 
section 120.1!; 
In Ezekiel v. ]ones Motor Co., Inc.16 the Supreme Judicial Court con-
sidered whether the absolute privilege to make defamatory statements 
that witnesses enjoy in judicial proceedings applies to the testimony of 
witnesses before a joint management-union grievance board.17 In 
Ezekiel, the plaintiff brought an action to recover damages against his 
former employer and one of its employees for an allegedly slanderous 
statement made before a union grievance board to the effect that the 
defendant employee had seen the plaintiff steal merchandise.18 At trial, 
the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but the trial judge entered 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the defendant on the ground 
that the statements made by the defendant at the grievance board 
hearing were protected by an absolute privilege.19 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed and held that the 
defendants enjoyed only a conditional privilege which can be destroyed 
upon a showing of malice or abuse of the privilege.20 The Court 
acknowledged that the defenda~t had a duty to explain the grounds 
for termination of plaintiff's employment at the grievance hearing.21 It 
noted, however, that the conditions under which he was giving testi-
mony differed significantly from those of a judicial proceeding.22 First, 
the defendant was not giving testimony under oath and therefore was 
not subject to perjury charges for giving false testimony.23 Second, he 
13 Id. 
14 G.L. c. 266, § 120. 
15 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 535, 373 N.E.2d at 218. 
16 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 333, 372 N.E.2d 1281. 
17 Id. at 335, 372 N.E.2d at 1284. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 334, 372 N.E.2d at 1283. 
2o Id. at 337, 372 N.E.2d at 1284. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 338, 372 N.E.2d at 1285. 
23 Id. 
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was not subject to the control of a judge who would limit his testimony 
to competent, relevant, and material evidence.24 The Court decided 
that since the safeguards present at a judicial proceeding do not exist 
at a management-union grievance hearing, a conditional privilege will 
provide sufficient motivation for candid testimony while retaining protec-
tion against deliberately false testimony.25 
The Court also rejected the defendant's contention that denying wit-
nesses an absolute privilege at management-union grievance hearings 
would impair the national labor policy of encouraging the settlement 
of labor disputes "through the processes of conference and collective 
bargaining in order to promote industrial peace." 26 In this regard, the 
Court relied on Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 25 27 
where the United States Supreme Court held that the National Labor 
Relations Act did not bar a state cause of action for the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress which arose in the context of a labor 
dispute.28 Although the present case involved a charge of slander, the 
Ezekiel Court noted that the state's interest in protecting its citizens 
from tortious conduct in both cases outweighs the potential interference 
with the federal scheme of labor regulation.29 Furthermore, the Court 
concluded, a conditional privilege would suffice to promote the candid 
discussion necessary to the settlement of labor disputes.30 
Mter determining that the defendant could not claim an absolute 
privilege, the Court considered whether he had forfeited his conditional 
privilege by exhibiting malice or bad faith. 31 Bad faith may be proved 
by a showing that the defendant acted because of an "improper motive." 32 
In Ezekiel the Court found evidence of an improper motive in the 
statements of the employer's regional and terminal managers.33 Since 
the managers were authorized to fire the plaintiff, the jury could have 
found that the defendant made his accusation to the grievance board 
to effectuate the managers' previously expressed desire to rid the com-
pany of an employee whose industrial accidents were costing the com-
pany too much money.34 The Court also determined that there was 
sufficient evidence of a causal connection between the employer's ill will 
24 Id. 
2~ Id. 
26 Id. at 338, 372 N.E.2d at 1285. 
27 430 u.s. 290 ( 1977). 
28 Id. at 304-05. 
29 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 340, 372 N.E.2d at 1286. 
3o Id. 
31 Id. at 342, 372 N.E.2d at 1286. 
32 Hartmann v. Boston Herald-Travelers Corp., 323 Mass. 56, 65, 80 N.E.2d 16, 
20 (1948). 
33 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 343, 372 N.E.2d at 1287. 
34 Id. at 344, 372 N.E.2d at 1287. 23
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and the alleged slanderous statement of the defendant employee to allow 
the question to go to the jury.85 The Court concluded that since the 
jury could have found that the defendant's statements were prompted 
by an improper motive, its verdict for the plaintiff was not in error. 86 
Truth is an absolute defense for slander. Thus, even if a defendant's 
statement is prompted by malice, the fact of its truth will shield the· de-
fendant from liability.37 In Bzeznik v. Chief of Police of Southampton,88 
the Supreme Judicial Court considered whether sealed felony convictions 
were admissible into evidence to establish truth as a defense to allega-
tions of slander. 39 The plaintiff, a gun license applicant, brought an 
action for declaratory and injunctive relief and for damages for slander . .o 
The plaintiff contended that since his prior felony convictions had been 
sealed, they could be used for no purposes other than those enumerated 
in the statute.41 He further argued that even if the fact of the convic-
tions were true, its truth could not be proved since under G.L. chapter 
276, section 100A, sealed records are not admissible in any court proceed-
ings except for the purpose of imposing sentences.42 
The Court, however, rejected plaintiff's arguments and held that the 
sealed records statute does not operate to render prior convictions non-
existent but rather assures their confidentiality under certain circum-
stances.43 Under G.L. chapter 276, section 100A, the Commissioner of 
Probation is to respond "to inquiries by authorized persons other than 
any law enforcement agency, any court, or any appointing authority, ... 
in the case of a sealed record ... that no record exists." Contrary to 
the plaintiff's contention, the Court concluded that this statutory lan-
guage must be interpreted to imply that law enforcement agencies, courts, 
and appointing authorities do have access to sealed criminal records.44 
Furthermore, the Court noted that under the gun licensing statutes,411 
the chief of police "has an affirmative duty to determine whether an 
applicant has 'any criminal record'." 46 Thus, in the Court's view, the 
defendant had not only the right, but also the duty to refer to the plain-
311 Id. 
36 Id.. 
37 Bander v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 313 Mass. 337, 342, 47 N.E.2d 
595, 598-99 (1943). 
38 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 461, 373 N.E.2d 1128. 
39 Id. at 462, 373 N.E.2d at 1130. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 466, 373 N.E.2d at 1132. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 470, 373 N.E.2d at 1133. 
44 Id. at 467, 373 N.E.2d at 1132. 
45 G.L. c. 140, §§ 122, 122B, and 131. 
46 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 468, n.5, 373 N.E.2d at 1133. 
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tiff's crimfnal record in determining his eligibility for gun licenses.47 
In addition, the Court held that by stipulating to the fact of his prior 
convictions in a statement of agreed facts filed with the trial court, the 
plaintiff waived any objections to the admission of evidence of those 
prior convictions.48 Thus, the Court concluded that the sealed record 
statute does not operate to erase the fact of a prior conviction and 
render it untrue for the purposes of the common law of defamation.49 
§13.6. Negligence. In Poirier v. Town of Plymouth 1 the Supreme 
Judicial Court changed the rule governing the duty owed by a land-
owner to an employee of an independent contractor to conform to the 
Mounsey 2 rule that a landowner owes a duty of reasonable care to all 
lawful visitors on the premises. Prior to. Poirier, an employee of an 
independent contractor employed by a landowner had the burden of 
showing that his injury was caused by the landowner's failure to warn 
of a hidden defect and that the defendant landowner, in the exercise of 
reasonable care, should have been aware that the defect existed.3 The 
Court first determined that according to the facts presented in Poirier 
the town was liable under the "hidden defect test." 4 It then ventured 
further and abrogated the hidden defect test in tort actions against 
landowners. 
In Poirier, an employee of an independent contractor hired by the 
town of Plymouth to paint the town's water tank brought an action 
against the town to recover damages for injuries sustained in a fall when 
the ladder "sprang out" from the side of the tank.6 At trial, the jury 
returned a verdict for the plaintiff. 6 The Appeals Court set aside the 
verdict and entered judgment for the defendant on the ground that 
there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict.7 The Supreme 
Judicial Court granted the plaintiff's petition for further appellate re-
view and reinstated the judgment of the superior court.8 In so doing 
the Court held that there was sufficient evidence on which a jury could 
conclude that a hidden defect existed; that the defendant, in the exercise 
of reasonable care, should have been aware of the defect; and that the 
47 Id. at 468, 373 N.E.2d at 1133. 
48 Id. at 471, 373 N.E.2d at 1133. 
49 Id. 
§13.6. 1 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 100, 372 N.E.2d 212. 
2 Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N .E.2d 43 ( 1973). 
3 Afienko v. Harvard Club, 365 Mass. 320, 329-30, 312 N.E.2d 196, 204 (1974). 
4 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 116, 372 N.E.2d at 223. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 100, 372 N.E.2d at 217. 
7 Id. at 101, 372 N.E.2d at 217. 
s Id. 
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plaintiff's injury was caused by the defendant's failure to warn plaintiff 
of the defect.9 
In reaching this ·decision the Court first considered whether the ad-
mission into evidence of inspection standards promulgated by the Ameri-
can Water Works Association was correct.10 It concluded that the 
admission was not improper.11 The Court found there was evidence 
that the superintendent of the town's water department was aware of 
the standards and that the standards had been approved by the regional 
water works association to which the superintendent belonged.12 Since 
the standards were probative as to whether the defendant was negligent 
in failing to inspect the ladders and discover the hidden defect, the 
standards were properly allqwed into evidence.13 
After concluding that the inspection standards were properly admitted, 
the Court overruled the Afienko hidden defect test.14 The Court limited 
its overruling of Afienko to cases involving "an injury suffered by one 
not an employee of the Defendant to do work on the property of the 
defendant." 15 The Court pointed out the inconsistency within the rule, 
which required that in order for an employee to recover, the defect 
must be hidden and yet must also be discoverable by the employer in 
the exercise of reasonable care. Furthermore, the Court noted that its 
recent ruling in Mounsey abrogating the practice of varying the duty of 
care owed by a landowner according to the status of the plaintiff cast 
doubt on the validity of the rule that the status of the plaintiff should 
be determinative of the tort standard of care.16 It observed that the 
same rationale was invoked in King v. G.S.M. Realty CorpP and in 
Lindsey v. Massios/ 8 where it was held that a landlord owes a duty o£ 
reasonable care to the tenant and to all lawful visitors.19 Applying this 
principle to the facts of Poirier, the Court pointed out that since an em-
ployee of an independent contractor engaged to work on the landowner's 
property is a lawful visitor, he too should be owed a duty of reasonable 
care. 20 The Court also commented that the "hidden defect" rule was 
similar to the "assumption of the risk" doctrine which was abolished by 
9 Id. at 107, 372 N.E.2d at 219. 
1o Id. at 105, 372 N.E.2d at 218. 
11 Id. at 105, 372 N.E.2d at 218-19. 
12 Id. at 105, 372 N.E.2d at 218. 
13 Id. at 105, 372 N.E.2d at 219. 
14 Id. at 116, 372 N.E.2d at 223. 
15 Id. at 117-18, 372 N.E.2d at 224. 
16 Id. at 120, 372 N.E.2d at 224. 
17 373 Mass. 658, 370 N.E.2d 413 (1977). 
18 372 Mass. 79, 360 N.E.2d 631 ( 1977). 
19 Id. at 82, 360 N.E.2d at 634. 
20 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 121, 372 N.E.2d at 225. 
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chapter 231, section 85.21 An independent contractor should not be made 
to suffer for the negligence of the property owner. The property owner 
should take those steps to prevent injury that are reasonable and ap-
propriate under the circumstances. Thus, the duty of care owed by a 
property owner to the employee of an independent contractor is the 
same as that owed to all other lawful visitors.22 
There were two concurring opinions in Poirier. Since the abrogation 
of the ''hidden defect" test had not been presented, briefed, or argued 
on appeal by the parties, Justice Quirico, joined by Chief Justice Hen-
nessey and Justice Wilkens, disagreed that this was an appropriate case 
in which to abrogate the rule.23 They did, however, agree with the 
Court's conclusion that there was a hidden defect that had caused the 
plaintiff's injury.24 Justice Braucher, on the other hand, took essentially 
the opposite position. He disagreed that there was a hidden defect 
but concurred in the abrogation of the ''hidden defect" test, finding it 
out of harmony with other recent developments in the area of workmen's 
compensation.25 
§13.7. Statute of Limitations. In Cannon v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.,1 
the Supreme Judicial Court once again considered the question of when 
a cause of action begins to accrue in a products liability case. In 
Cannon, the plaintiff brought an action to recover for injuries sustained 
from the collapse of an aluminum ladder. The plaintiff alleged that the 
defendants were negligent in the manufacture and design of the ladder 
and breached the warranties of fitness and merchantability.2 The action 
was brought within two years of the plaintiffs injury, but approximately 
nine years after the manufacture and sale of the ladder.3 An appeal 
was made after the defendant's motion for summary judgment was 
allowed on the ground that the statute of limitations barred both the 
warranty and negligence counts.4 The Supreme Judicial Court reversed. 
In reaching its decision the Court rejected the defendant's contention 
that Omni Flying ·Club, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co.5 requires that the 
21 Id. at 121-22, 372 N.E.2d at 225. 
22 Id. at 127, 372 N.E.2d at 227. 
23 Id. at 128, 372 N.E.2d at 228. 
24 Id. 
211 Id. at 129, 372 N.E.2d at 228-29. 
§13.7. 1 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 819, 374 N.E.2d 582. 
2 Id. at 819, 374 N.E.2d at 582-83. 
s Id. at 820, 374 N.E.2d at 583. 
4 Id. Since the plaintiff did not argue the issue of the applicability of the statute 
of limitations to his claim for breach of warranties, the only issue on appeal was 
whether the plaintiff was barred by the statute of limitations on his negligence 
count. Id. 
II 366 Mass. 154, 315 N.E.2d 885 ( 1974). 
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limitation period be measured from the date of manufacture or from 
the date of sale. 6 It noted that Omni was predicated upon the negligent 
sale as well as the negligent manufacture of the airplane.7 As a result, 
the act~on brought in Omni was not barred by the statute of limitations, 
because the cause of action accrued on the date of sale, which, under the 
circumstances could also be regarded as the date of injury.8 After dis-
tinguishing Omni, the Court ruled that since negligence, harm, and 
causation must be shown before a negligence action for personal injury 
can be maintained, it would be unjust to bar the plaintiff's action even 
before the harm occurred.9 In a products liability case, for instance, the 
cause of action commences to run from the time of injury and not from 
the time of manufacture or sale of the defective product.10 The Court 
noted that although the burden on defendant manufacturers and re-
tailers would be greater in defending these delayed actions, the burden 
would likewise be greater on the plaintiff in proving its case and over-
coming the inferences of intervening negligence.H The Court further 
commented that the determination of the accrual of a cause of action 
in a products liability case predicated upon negligence as the date of 
injury was in accordance with the time for the accrual of a cause of 
action in a breach of warranty action.12 Thus, the Court held that the 
plaintiff's claim was not barred by the statute of limitations, because 
in accordance with the prevailing rule in products liability cases, the 
cause of action arose at the time of injury, not at the time of manu-
facture.13 
§13.8. Landlord and Tenant. It is the general rule that an inten-
tional tort or crime committed by a third person is a superseding cause 
of harm to the plaintiff even though the defendant's conduct created the 
opportunity for the intentional tort or crime.1 If, however, the defend-
ant should have realized that his negligence would create an opportu-
nity for the commission of such tort or crime by a third party and that 
a third party might avail himself of the opportunity to commit an 
intentional tort or crime, then such tort or crime is not a superseding 
cause of the plaintiff's harm.2 
6 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 821, 374 N.E.2d at 583. 
7 Id. at 821-22, 374 N.E.2d at 583-84. 
s Id. at 822, 374 N.E.2d at 584. 
9 Id. at 822-23, 374 N.E.2d at 584. 
1o Id. at 822, 374 N.E.2d at 584. 
11 Id. at 823, 374 N.E.2d at 584. 
12 Id. Under G.L. c. 106, § 2-318, the statute of limitations in a breach of warranty 
action begins to run after the date of injury and damage occurs. 
13 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 822-23, 374 N.E.2d at 584. 
§13.8. 1 Barboza v. Decas, 311 Mass. 10, 40 N.E.2d 10 (1942). 
2 Bellows v. Worcester Storage Co., 297 Mass. 188, 7 N.E.2d 588 ( 1937). 
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The issue of superseding cause was raised in Gidwani v. Wasserman.3 
In Gidwani, a tenant storeowner brought an action against his landlord 
seeking recovery for wrongful entry and repossession of the leased 
premises and for compensation for merchandise stolen from the premises 
as a consequence of the landlord's having disengaged the burglar alarm.4 
At trial, the judge found that the landlord, in repossessing the premises, 
had failed to comply with the notice requirement of the lease.5 She 
concluded, therefore, that the landlord's entry and repossession of the 
premises was unlawful.6 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the finding of the 
Court of Appeals that there was no error in the trial court's rulings.7 
The Court first upheld the judge's ruling that the landlord's entry was 
unlawful. 8 It did so on the ground that it was not plainly wrong 9 for 
the judge to conclude, largely on the basis of oral evidence, that the 
lease's notice requirement had not been met.10 The Court also con-
cluded that the burglary which occurred subsequent to the landlord's 
wrongful entry was not a superseding cause which would relieve the 
landlord of liability.11 With respect to the burglary, the Court noted 
that the "likelihood of burglary was a natural and foreseeable con-
sequence of [the landlord's] unlawful entry and subsequent conduct." 12 
It reasoned that a burglary could be a natural and probable consequence 
of the landlord's disengaging an alarm, the purpose of which was to 
protect the building from such acts.13 Thus, the Court concluded, the 
burglary was not a superseding cause, and the landlord's negligence in 
failing to reset the alarm after disengaging it rendered him liable for 
the loss resulting from the burglary .14 
During the Survey year the Supreme Judicial Court considered and 
left undisturbed the rules with respect to a landlord's duty of care in 
maintaining areas within a tenant's control. These rules provide that 
in the absence of an agreement imposing a duty on the landlord to 
keep the premises safe, the landlord is not liable to a tenant for injuries 
3 373 Mass. 162, 365 N.E.2d 827 ( 1977). 
4 Id. at 163, 365 N.E.2d at 829. 
li Id. at 166, 365 N.E.2d at 830. 
6 Id. at 165,.365 N.E.2d at 830. 
7 'Id, at 163, 365 N.E.2d at 829. 
s Id. at 166, 365 N.E.2d at 830. 
9 Gannon v. MacDonald, 361 Mass. 851, 851-52, 279 N.E.2d 668, 669 (1972); 
Colbert v. Hennessey, 351 Mass. 131, 145, 217 N.E.2d 914, 924 (1966). 
IO 373 Mass. at 166, 365 N.E.2d at 930. 
11 Id. at 166-67, 365 N.E.2d at 830-31. 
12 Id. at 167, 365 N.E.2d at 831. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
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suffered by a tenant for failure of the landlord to execute repairsY' 
Agreements to keep premises in a safe condition, which imply access 
by the landlord to the premises, have been distinguished from agree-
ments to make repairs on the premises, which require notice to the 
landlord before the duty, to repair is imposed.16 Where the landlord 
gratuitously makes faulty repairs that result in injuries, in the absence 
of an agreement to make ,repairs, the plaintiff must prove gross negli-
gence by the landlord in making those repairs.J7 If, however, there is 
an agreement to make repairs, a tenant may recover for injuries suffered 
as a result of faulty repairs upon a showing of ordinary negligence.1s 
In Markarian v. Simorian 19 the plaintiffs, a two-year-old child and 
his father, sued their landlord for injuries suffered by the child when it 
fell through a window screen allegedly installed in a negligent manner 
by the defendants' mother.20 The apartment where the injuries occurred 
was originally owned by the defendants' parents.21 In 1949 it was placed 
in a trust of which the defendants served as trustees.22 At trial the 
judge granted the defendants' motion for a directed verdict.23 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed.24 The defendants 
conceded that their parents had made an agreement to make repairs 
for the plaintiffs, but they argued that the agreement applied only 
to those repairs necessary at the commencement of the tenancy and 
not to those needed six years later.25 The Court rejected this contention, 
however, finding that the evidence presented precluded such a limited 
construction of the agreement.26 The Court also rejeeted the defendants' 
argument that they were not bound by the agreement to repair because 
it had been made by their parents and not the defendants themselves.27 
It concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's 
finding that an agency relationship did exist between the defendants 
and their parents.28 
15 DiMarzo v. S. & P. Realty Corp., 364 Mass. 510, 513, 306 N.E.2d 432, 434 
(1974). 
16 Id. 
17 Carney v. Bereault, 348 Mass. 502, 508, 204 N.E.2d 448, 452 ( 1965). 
18 364 Mass. at 513, 306 N.E.2d at 434; Koleshinski v. David, 328 Mass. 276, 279, 
103 N.E.2d 262, 264 ( 1952). 
19 373 Mass. 669, 369 N.E.2d 718 ( 1977). 
2o Id. at 671, 369 N.E.2d at 720. 
21 Id. at 670, 369 N.E.2d at 719. 
22 Id. at 670, 369 N.E.2d at 719-20. 
23 Id. at 670, 369 N.E.2d at 720. 
24 Id. at 676, 369 N.E.2d at 722. 
25 Id. at 673, 369 N.E.2d at 721. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 673-74, 369 N.E.2d at 721. 
28 Id. at 674, 369 N.E.2d at 721. 
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The Court also declined to accept the defendants' final contention 
that they were not liable for the injuries to the child because those 
injuries were not a foreseeable harm within the purpose of the agree-
ment to repair.29 To support their position, the defendants relied upon 
Chelefou v. Springfield Institution for Savings. 3° Chelefou, like Mar-
karian, concerned a child injured as a result of a fall through a screen 
improperly installed by the landlord.31 The Chelefou Court upheld the 
trial court's direction of a verdict for the defendant on the ground 
that the injuries suffered by the child were not a foreseeable harm when 
the agreement to repair was made.32 
Despite the factual similarities between the two cases, the Markarian 
Court noted several significant differences. First, the Court found that 
in Markarian, the defendants' mother created a situation in which a 
previously safe situation was rendered dangerous by the repairs itsel£.33 
Second, the Court noted that the low height of the window in Markarian 
made it likely that a defective installation of the screen would pose 
a hazard to a small child.34 Finally, there was evidence in Markarian 
that the defendants' mother said that she was repairing the window 
so that it would be safe.35 Thus, the Court found Chelefou distinguish-
able from Markarian and concluded that the directed verdict was 
improperly granted.36 
§13.9. Attractive Nuisance. The Survey year was the scene of the 
enactment by the General Court of an attractive nuisance statute.1 
Generally, the duty owed by an owner or occupier of land to a tres-
passer is to refrain from wanton or reckless conduct.2 Even amidst 
the recent reforms in Massachusetts tort law regarding standards of 
care owed by owners or occupiers of land, this lesser duty owed to 
trespassers has remained unchanged. 3 There are, however, several ex-
ceptions to the duty of care owed to trespassers,4 the most recent of 
29 Id. at 675, 369 N.E.2d at 722. 
30 297 Mass. 236, 8 N.E.2d 769 (1937). 
31 Id. at 238, 8 N.E.2d at 771. 
32 Id. at 241, 8 N.E.2d at 772. 
33 373 Mass. at 675, 369' N.E.2d at 722. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. The Court noted that since Chelefou was distinguishable, it did not need 
to overrule it. It did state, however, that it found the Chelefou result "of dubious 
validity." Id. 
§13.9. 1 Acts of 1977, c.259 adding new G.L. c. 231, § 85Q. 
2 Chronopoulos v. Gil Wyner Co., Inc., 334 Mass. 593, 596, 137 N.E.2d 667, 
669 (1956). 
3 See Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 ( 1973). 
4 Pridgen v. Boston Housing Authority, 364 Mass. 696, 711, 308 N.E.2d 467, 
477 (1974) (duty of reasonable care owed to known trespasser in a position of 
peril); Chronopoulos v. Gil Wyner Co., Inc., 334 Mass. 593, 597, 137 N.E.2d 667, 
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which is G.L. chapter 231, section 85Q, the attractive nuisance doctrine. 
Under this statute a person who maintains an artificial condition on 
his land will be liable for physical harm suffered by trespassing children 
under the following conditions: 
. . . if (a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which 
the land owner knows or has reason to know that children are 
likely to trespass, (b) the condition is one of which the land owner 
knows or has reason to know and which he realizes or should realize 
will involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm 
to such children, (c) the children because of their youth do not 
discover the conpition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling 
with it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, (d) the 
utility to the land owner of maintaining the condition and the 
burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the 
risk to children involved, and (e) the land owner fails to exercise 
reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect the 
children.5 
The attractive nuisance doctrine, which is aimed at providing pro-
tection to trespassing children enticed onto property by artificial con-
ditions has had a long history in other jurisdictions.6 By 1934, the 
doctrine was recognized in section 339 of the Restatement of Torts, 
but without the fiction of "attractive." At present there are only a few, 
if any, jurisdictions that continue to reject a duty to foreseeable child 
trespassers.7 In the commonwealth the doctrine had been continually 
rejected by the courts since 1891.8 The enactment of section 85Q has 
brought Massachusetts into line with the vast majority of jurisdictions 
which have recognized the need to protect children from this im-
maturity and poor judgment. 
669 ( 1957) (duty of reasonable care owed by owner or possessor who induces 
trespasser to believe that his property is a public way); Haskins v. Grybko, 301 
Mass. 322, 323, 17 N.E.2d 146 ( 1938) (duty of ordinary care owed to trespasser on 
property of neighbor); G.L. c.84, § 27 (no cases interpreting this statute but it 
seems to impose strict liability on persons in control of property who fail to put up 
a sufficient railing between a public way and a hazardous excavation). 
5 G.L. c. 231, § 85Q. 
6 See Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657 (1873). 
7 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 59 (4th ed. 1971) (7 
jurisdictions continue to reject this duty). At least 3 jurisdictions adopted the 
attractive nuisance doctrine since 1971. Jones v. Billings, 289 A. 2d 39 (Me. 1972); 
Haddad v. First Nat'! Stores, 109 R.I. 59, 280 A.2d 93 (1971); G.L. c. 231, § 85Q). 
8 Daniels v. New York and N.E. R.R. Co., 154 Mass. 349, 354, 28 N.E. 283, 
285 (1891). 
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